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use extrPme caution. 
Id.- Civil Liability-
See Cal.Jur., 
§ 22 et seq. 
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burden of on defendant it is erroneous. 
[5a, 5b] Id.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death o[ 
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's it is 
error to instruct that mere fact that accident 
considered alone, does not inference that 
some or any to action was negligent, since such instruc-
tion in effect tells jury that fact that child was killed by bullet 
from defendant's gun affords no evidence of and 
though instructions on res ipsa loquitur were not re-
jury should not be foreclosed from considering evi-
dence provided by happening of accident itself in determining 
whether defendant was negligent. 
[6] Id.-Civil Liability.-Ordinarily accidents resulting from dis-
of fhearms do not occur if persons using them use due 
care. 
[7] !d.-Civil Liability-Instructions.-In action for death of 
child who was struck by bullet from defendant's rifle, it is 
!'rror to instruct Jury that "unavoidable" or "inevitable" acci-
dent simply denotes accident that occurred without having 
been proximately caused by negligence, and that even if such 
accident could have been avoided by exercise of exceptional 
foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be held liable for 
injuries resulting from it. 
APPEAI, from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis-
laus County and from an order denying a new trial. Sherrill 
Halbert, ,Judge. ,Judgment reversed; appeal from order dis-
missed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. ,Judgment for 
defendant reversed. 
Vernon F. Gant for Appellants. 
David I<'. Bush and Bush, Ackley & JVIilich for Respondent. 
'l'RAYNOR, J.-Judgment was entered on a verdict for 
defendant in an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs appeal 
from the judgment and the order denying their motion for 
a new trial. Since the latter order is not appealable, the 
appeal therefrom is dismissed. 
On May 21, 1951, Bonnie, 12, and her sister, Carolyn, 8, 
got off the school bus at the intersection of vVren and Sierra 
roads in Stanislaus County at about 4 :10 p. m. and started 
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\Y ren Hoad. Defendant's home is located 
to the 1wst of the intersection of \Vren and 
Sierra which bound his farm land on the east and 
north. He testified that he >vas acquainted with the ,Jensen 
chilc1ren and had frequently seen them off the bus at 
\Ynn and Sierra roads. He saw them off on the m 
while he was with a friend on the patio of 
his home and \Yatched them \Vren Road 
until were lost from view. At about this time he stood 
up and :fired a .22 caliber rifle at a sparrow in his straw-
berry patch approximately 60 or 65 feet away. He looked 
up and down ·wren R.oad and into the field beyond before 
firing and the children were not in sight. Shortly after firing 
the rifle, he heard a child scream, and he ran toward vVren 
Road and found Bonnie lying on the road approximately 180 
feet south of his line of fire and approximately 200 yards 
from the point of firing. She had been struck in the head 
by a bullet from his gun and died later that day. To support 
their theory that defendant must have fired in the direction 
of the children, plaintiffs introduced expert testimony in-
dicating that the bullet had not ricocheted. Defendant intro-
duced expert testimony indicating that it had. To prove 
that he was not negligent in failing to foresee the possibility 
of harm from a richochet, he presented expert testimony that 
the chance of the accident's happening as a result of a ricochet 
was only one in ten million. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that "One who causes injury to another by 
discharging a firearm must, in order to excuse himself from 
liability, show that he was absolutely without fault." This 
instruction, taken from the opinion of the court in Rudd v. 
Byrnes, 156 Cal. 636, 640 [J05 P. 957, 20 Ann.Cas. 124, 26 
1-l.R.A.N.S. 134], not only requires that the defendant be 
absolutely without fault but places the burden of proof of this 
issue on him. [1] In ordinary negligence cases, however, 
the standard of care is ordinary care under the circumstances 
and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The question is 
presented, therefore, whether the court in the Rudd case 
meant to establish a special rule to govern injuries caused 
firearms. When the language is read in context, it is clear 
that the court did not establish such a rule, but was merely 
emphasizing the proposition that owing to the dangerous 
character of the instrumentality ordinary care in the use 
of firearms requires a very high degree of caution. [2] "In 
care in the use 
cantion or iu terms of 
that the 
it was 




J.-I concur in 
do not agree with the 
its conclusion is based. 
It is my considered 
quired of one who u"'""""L 
can only be excused from 
by a sho\ving that he -vvas a<,0VJ.UVGL 
prejudicial error for the trial 
jury accordh1gly. 
upon which 
standard of care re-
that a person 
caused to others 
without fault, and it was 
to refuse to instruct the 
In the standard of care in firearm cases 
under common la-w it is stated in Pollock's Law of Torts, 
15th edition ( that ''The risk incident to deal-
ing with fire, inflammable mat-
ters, corrosive or otherwise or noxious fluids, and 
(it is apprehended) is accounted by the common law 
among those which the actor to strict responsibility. 
Sometimes the term 'consummate care' is used to describe the 
it is doubtful whether even 
we do not know of any 
English case of this kind nuder some recognized 
head of where unsuccessful on the de-
fendant's part was held to exonerate him." This standard 
which would appear to border doctrine of strict lia-
bility has been our American courts in different 
ways. As summed up in American Jurisprudence (voL 56, 
p. 1006), ''The of care to be exercised in the use or 
handling of a firearm is determined the application of 
general rules to the care which must be exercised by 
one using dangerous or instrumentalities. It is often 
said tl1at a yery of care is required from all 
persons firearms in the immediate of others re-
gardless of hmY lawful or innocent such use may be, or that 
more than ordinary care to prevent to others is re-
quired. Some courts refer to the degree of care required 
331 
1 nry 
is statr(1 that ''Some courts 
person to strict rules re-
from the has been held 
that one is liable inflicted by 
an nniutentional of a firearm he shows that 
was unavoidable. several cases it is said that 
is not whether the was accidentally 
but whether the defendant was free from all blame. 
to the of these cases, it is no defense that 
the act occurred by and '"'·ithout the wrong-
doer's intending it. The defendant must show such circum-
stances as would make it appear the court that the injury 
r1one to the plaintiff ·was and the defendant was 
not with any 
of liability on a person 
gnn at a 
another person 
intended 
uauH'"'"' to show in defense his freedom from negli-
gence tbe of. But even with 
such an action it ma,v be said that one who is in 
no:ssess1.0ll of a loaded gnn is 
of 
the 
'lral of care from one firearms. 
other illustrates the standard 
in the case 
20 1\.nn. Cas. 
care was 
had 
the evidence shows 
eare and that he not 
doubtful that 
that the defendant 
verdict for the defendant based n pon evh1ener> 




in Rtulcl v. 
an instruction expressly 
a standard should have been and was 
the of the standard of care 
pei it ion for a was denied May 1 R, 
